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British Euroskepticism
 On January 23, 2013, Britain’s Prime Minister David 
Cameron gave a speech in which he declared himself in 
favor of “fundamental, far-reaching change” in the EU. 
Perhaps most importantly, he promised “a referendum 
with a very simple in or out choice”.  Of course this is not 
the first time that a British leader expresses skepticism 
on the EU.  Yet Cameron’s speech was especially force-
ful and Britain is the only member state so far where a 
separatist party like the UK Independence Party is able 
to poll at 25% of the electorate.
 The fact is that Euroskepticism seems to have 
greater political traction in Britain than in other EU 
countries, both among political leaders and among 
voters.  So the question is, why does Euroskepticism 
work so well both among British politicians and in public 
opinion?  Is British Euroskepticism of a different nature 
than other national varieties of Euroskepticism – or is 
it a harbinger of things to come elsewhere?
 The contributors to this EUSA Forum give some-
what different answers to these questions.  Oliver 
Daddow argues that British Euroskepticism is primarily 
an artifact of British party politics, especially within the 
Conservative Party.  In his reading, Cameron’s invoca-
tion of a referendum is a clumsy attempt to contain the 
rise of the UK Independence Party.  Paul Taggart also 
highlights the peculiarity of the Conservative Party’s 
Euroskepticism and its capacity to hijack British poli-
tics. This leads the UK to adopt “paradoxical” stances 
vis-à-vis the EU – paving the way for what may turn 
out to be the first exit from the EU by a major member 
state.  Simon Usherwood considers the two faces of 
British Euroskepticism.  Although he sees ground for 
an “exceptionalist” interpretation, he also notes that 
Britain’s Euroskepticism could easily become a “model” 
if EU institutions do not find ways to better “connect” 
with the peoples of Europe.  Considering Britain “from 
the continent,” Doreen Allerkamp takes a more relaxed 
view.  She argues that British Euroskepticism has been 
successfully managed ever since the UK joined the EU, 
and will remain manageable in the future.  In her read-
ing, Britain’s Euroskepticism is not of a fundamentally 
different nature than other national varieties of Euro-
skepticism.
Nicolas Jabko
EUSA Review Editor
The Ghosts of the Past: The Conservative Party 
and the EU Referendum Debate in Britain
Oliver Daddow
 Unsolved European dilemmas dating back to the 
John Major and Maastricht Treaty years threaten to 
throw the Conservative Party into yet another period 
of rebellion and turmoil. The prominent showing of the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the May 
2013 local authority elections was swiftly heralded by 
its leader, Nigel Farage, as a ‘game changer’ in British 
politics (BBC 2013). UKIP averaged over 25% of the 
vote in the wards in which its candidates stood. Most 
of the broadcast and print media went uncritically along 
with Farage’s characterization of the result. Never one 
to under-egg a pudding, the BBC’s political editor, Nick 
Robinson, blogged: ‘It is the day UKIP emerged as a real 
political force in the land’ (Robinson 2013). UKIP’s rise 
was particularly damaging to the Conservative Party, 
which hemorrhaged votes. UKIP attracted many disaf-
fected Conservative followers disillusioned with what 
they see as fudge, delay and broken promises on the 
thorny and related questions of Britain’s relationship with 
the European Union (EU) and immigration. 
 The fallout from the local elections has been that the 
EU withdrawal option – hitherto occupying a relatively 
marginal place within British political discourse – has 
assumed a degree of legitimacy that it did not quite pos-
sess beforehand. Some organs of the UK media, notably 
the Daily Express with its ‘Get Britain Out’ campaign, 
launched in November 2010, have been joined by a host 
of high profile opinion formers, all pushing for Britain to 
sever formal ties with the EU. Most notably, Conservative 
grandees such as Nigel Lawson and Cabinet ministers 
such as Education Secretary Michael Gove and Defence 
Secretary Philip Hammond, have started publicly to 
make the case that Britain is better off outside the EU, 
economically, politically and strategically (Morris 2013). 
 Accounting for the party political context of the UK’s 
debates about Europe helps us put Farage’s claims 
about ‘change’ into their proper light. Is it ‘change’ or a 
new take on an old story? ‘Change’ might be too grand 
a word for what is unfolding, although there might be 
some merit in the description, with two qualifications in 
place. First, the Conservative Party has suffered from 
travails over the Europe question for two decades and 
more, back at least as far as the Maastricht Treaty ne-
gotiations of 1991-93. What has changed is neither the 
issue, its framing, nor necessarily its salience to voters. 
Instead, what appears to have happened is that David 
Cameron’s pledge to hold a post-renegotiation referen-
dum in 2017 has backfired more seriously than he could 
have imagined after he made his Bloomberg speech 
in January 2013 (Cameron 2013). The biggest game 
changer is not that UKIP picked up so many disaffected 
voters, but that a Conservative Prime Minister created 
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such an obvious opportunity for it to do so. It should 
come as no shock to anyone that, given the mid-term 
second order election contest, the British public should 
wish to kick the government and warn it over its confused 
European policy. An overt and astute populist leader on 
the political right, Farage has positioned himself and his 
party very well to gain from Cameron’s unsure handling 
of this sensitive topic.   
 Second, on the Europe question more than any other 
in British politics, the public and organized opposition 
have learnt the hard way: that decision-making elites 
like to keep a tight strategic grip on the pace and nature 
of Britain’s engagement with the EU. Take, for example, 
New Labour’s 1997 ‘five economic tests’ on single cur-
rency membership, or its approach to the Lisbon Treaty 
a decade later (see Daddow 2011). Trust in politicians 
– never very high – is particularly thin on matters Euro-
pean. Promising to resolve the Europe issue on the one 
hand, the Coalition government has, on the other, put 
two arguably much more serious obstacles in the way. 
To begin with, Cameron’s Conservatives have to win 
the next general election with an outright parliamentary 
majority. Then, there has to be a successful renegotiation 
of the terms of the UK’s membership of the EU, which 
convinces Eurosceptics in particular that there will be 
no further encroachments on British sovereignty. This 
echoes the tactic used by Harold Wilson which paved 
the way for the 1975 referendum on continued member-
ship of the European Economic Community. The result 
then was a decisive 2-1 majority in favour of staying in 
the club. Neither outcome looks particularly likely at the 
present time.
 As usual in Britain, the Europe question is refracted 
through the prism of party politics, in this case Conser-
vative Party management. In David Cameron, the Con-
servative Party found a leader who has been content to 
present himself as a pragmatic Eurosceptic, appealing 
to all sectors of the parliamentary and grass roots party. 
While he was riding high in the opinion polls against 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and ‘winning’ the 2010 
election, he could just about quell the rumblings of dis-
content on the Conservative right. Now push has come 
to shove, however, he has shown himself to be a weak 
tactician and a not much more competent strategist. The 
Europe question saw off Margaret Thatcher, humiliated 
William Hague and it now threatens to destabilise the 
government’s focus on arguably much more important 
domestic matters, such as economic rebuiliding. Al-
though a pre-2015 referendum still remains a remote 
possibility, one thing is certain – the Eurosceptics in the 
Conservative Party and beyond are sniffing blood. The 
ghosts of the Major years might yet return to haunt the 
Conservative Party. 
Oliver Daddow
University of Leicester
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The Peculiarities and Paradoxes of 
Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom
Paul Taggart
 We have come to accept, almost as a given, that the 
British relationship with European integration is difficult. 
It has become almost normal to expect British public 
opinion to remain doggedly among the most hostile to 
integration in Europe. And it has become an expecta-
tion that British politicians in dealing with the European 
Union and with other European states will be playing 
to a domestic audience that is, at best, sceptical and 
often hostile to integration. But we tend to forget how 
peculiar and paradoxical Euroscepticism in the UK is. 
 Of the many states in Europe, there are good rea-
sons why we might expect the union that is the United 
Kingdom to be one of the most comfortable with a re-
gional integration project. The United Kingdom is after 
all itself an integrated state made up of multiple nations 
with distinct identities. The union has been integrated 
gradually over time through a process of enlargement 
with different types of incorporation. The current struc-
tural arrangements represent a variable geometry of in-
stitutional powers with Westminster, Cardiff, Edinburgh 
and Stormont exercising very different competences, in 
very different ways and – increasingly – with different 
types of politics being associated with each of the parts. 
And as a whole there is a substantial imbalance with 
this union having one large component national unit 
and a number of smaller ones.  But we know that the 
United Kingdom has remained the most persistently Eu-
4     Spring 2013 EUSA Review
rosceptical of all European states.  So the first paradox 
is that an integrated multi-national state with unevenly 
sized component parts has produced such sustained 
opposition to the project to create an integrated Europe 
made up of multiple states of different size and forms.
 One of the key reasons for British Euroscepticism 
lies in its party system and particularly in one of its par-
ties. The British system has a peculiarity of being one of 
the only states to have one of its major parties govern 
as a ‘soft’ Eurosceptic party.  While smaller parties of 
the left and right have developed Eurosceptical agendas 
across Europe and have entered into government (Tag-
gart & Szczerbiak, 2013), they have had nothing like 
the importance of the Conservative Party within their 
systems.  Even the recent spectacular rise of a British 
new populist party like UKIP should not blind us to the 
overwhelming factor of just how unusual the Conserva-
tive Party’s Euroscepticism is.  But this does not mean 
the issue is easy for Conservatives. Europe played its 
part in the defenestration of Margaret Thatcher, caused 
her successor no end of problems and recently David 
Cameron has come to experience the particular difficul-
ties that Europe throws up for party and parliamentary 
management. The paradox remains that Europe seems 
a crucial issue for the party but it remains a largely toxic 
issue for it.
 The difficult nature of the issue for party manage-
ment gives rise to another paradox. For a polity so 
defensive of its own institutional arrangements and so 
protective of its forms of politics, it is paradoxical that 
the two major parties of Westminster have repeated 
resorted to the most un-British and un-parliamentary 
of mechanisms to deal with the European issue. One 
of the most emblematic of parliamentary systems has 
repeatedly resorted to referendums or pledges of them 
(see Oppermann, 2012) to deal with Europe.  For the 
Labour Party the use of a referendum on the terms of 
British accession to Europe settled the difficult issue of 
party management in 1975. For Tony Blair, the pledge 
to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 
2004 effectively neutralised the issue at the subsequent 
general election. And for the Conservative element of 
the current coalition government the promise of a ref-
erendum has become the tool by which Cameron has 
sought to manage the issue. While for his backbenchers 
the referendum commitment has become a tool with 
which to attempt to beat the leadership onto a path 
marked exit.  In the end they may succeed.  The twin 
paradoxes of a major party advocating Euroscepticism 
and using referendum pledges to deal with the issue of 
Europe may well lead to the ultimate peculiarity of the 
first major EU state leaving the Union.
Paul Taggart
University of Sussex
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British Euroscepticism: Outlier or Exemplar?
Simon Usherwood
 One of the key questions that might be asked of 
euroscepticism in the UK is the extent to which is it typi-
cal of a wider pattern, as opposed to simply a special 
situation in a peculiar set of circumstances. Both cases 
have been made, but it is useful to briefly rehearse the 
arguments once more here.
 What is not in any doubt is that there is a strong 
sense of insularity – in both the metaphorical and the 
literal senses of the word – about the British debate 
on European integration. The British national myth of 
standing apart from ‘the Continent’, ‘of Europe, but not 
in Europe’ in Churchill’s famous phrase, recurs with a 
regularity that only underlines the lack of any alternative 
framing that is so pervasive. It plays into geography, 
history, legal models and even culture (especially with 
that ‘special relationship’ across the Atlantic). In this 
model, there is much to be proud of in being British, 
that to wish it away is an almost impossible demand of 
politicians or other public figures: there is no agenda 
of modernisation, post-authoritarian reconstruction or 
any of the other myths that have framed other countries’ 
debates.
 Beyond the insular framing, we also have to ac-
knowledge the relative extent of the ‘European’ debate 
in the UK: it is hard to think of any other member state 
where the purpose, value and direction of the European 
Union has quite so much discussion and debate by 
political actors and wider civil society, referendum or 
accession debates elsewhere notwithstanding. In part, 
this reflects the lack of pervasive embedding of mem-
bership into the political elite, where scepticism was 
always an option, even before the 1990s. It also reflects 
on the role of the media in public life. Importantly, the 
pervasiveness of the debate should not be confused 
with its profundity: ‘more heat than light’ often feels like 
a generous description of a debate that often struggles 
to get out of the pub in which it apparently began.
 This, in turn, leads to the final distinct aspect of the 
British debate, namely the types of options under con-
sideration. Only in the UK is withdrawal of membership 
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seriously considered as a viable path for public policy. 
In other states, the main thrust is one of reform, rather 
than rejection: even figures such as Vaclav Klaus speak 
like this. This is tied into the frames already mentioned, 
where ‘Europe’ is a necessary vehicle for a bigger na-
tional project and needs to be made to work.
 Set against this ‘exceptionalist’ reading, we do still 
need to appreciate that there is much than is not so 
different from elsewhere. At a mundane level, euros-
cepticism is now found in every member state; indeed, 
in every European state. Moreover, in all those states, 
there are exceptionalist frames, talking of national par-
ticularities, Sonderwege and the rest. To focus on the 
exceptions is to miss the wider structural issues raised 
by publics and elites.
 Swinging back to the UK, it is also necessary to ac-
knowledge that the rhetoric does not match the practice: 
the British government does try – as much as possible, 
and especially when away from the limelight – to be a 
constructive partner in the Union. The political culture 
of rigorous debate before committing to action is stylisti-
cally different from many European partners, but which 
has the same ultimate intent behind it. Indeed, in the 
context of the current crisis, it has much to commend 
it as an approach. From the internal market to defence 
to CAP reform, the UK has acted to produce more 
sustainable and useful integration.
 But perhaps the biggest danger in seeing the UK 
as an outlier is that is distracts from the challenge that 
European integration as a whole faces. In searching for 
reasons why we don’t need to get too concerned about 
losing a country that doesn’t appear too bothered about 
being a member, we will miss the failure of European 
elites to find answers to the Laeken goals of connecting 
with the peoples of Europe. This is a British euroscepti-
cism, but it is important we see it as part of a Europe-
wide phenomenon, and a model that risks becoming 
more, not less, typical if we do not find a way to build a 
system of integration that works for today’s problems.
Simon Usherwood
University of Surrey
British Euroscepticism – A View 
from “the Continent”
Doreen K. Allerkamp
 Ever since Great Britain missed – or rather, refused 
to get on to – the boat at Messina, its relationship with 
“the Continent” has been an issue almost akin to “the 
German question”. Yet unlike the latter, it has been more 
troublesome for the country concerned than for the 
rest of the EU. Not since Charles de Gaulle famously 
blocked Britain’s accession twice in the 1960s for both 
economic and political reasons has any European 
leader seriously argued that the UK should not be part 
of the EU. Nor has any US administration, for that mat-
ter, even though more radical British Eurosceptics have 
repeatedly (but in vain) sought American support for an 
alternative to British EU membership along the lines of 
some form of enhanced Transatlanticism. Inside the UK, 
the picture is a different one, as both elite and popular 
Euroscepticism have proved enduring phenomena 
and the EU and its workings have been continuously 
subject to political controversy – if not topping the cur-
rent agenda, then bubbling ominously just beneath the 
surface. From a Continental perspective, two points 
about the contested nature of Britain’s relationship with 
the European Union seem particularly worth making.
 First, British Euroscepticism is by no means a ho-
mogenous, categorically distinct phenomenon, exclu-
sive to the British Isles. On the one hand, it is primarily 
an English phenomenon, as neither Scotland nor Wales 
have ever been particularly Eurosceptic. Indeed, there 
is an argument that Euroscepticism is at the heart of 
English nationalism, for which European integration is 
a threatening and thereby uniting perspective, while it 
constitutes more of a political opportunity for Scotland 
and Wales (cf. Wellings 2012). Accordingly, the attempt 
by Nigel Farage, leader of Britain’s most explicitly Eu-
rosceptic political party, the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP), to campaign in Scotland, received a less than 
warm welcome.1  On the other hand, other EU member 
states have also displayed various forms of Euroscepti-
cism, and continue to do so to this day. Most have par-
ties with Eurosceptic views, if not single-issue anti-EU 
parties. Since February 2013, even Germany has its first 
and only single-issue Eurosceptic party, Alternative für 
Deutschland, which has yet to face an electoral contest, 
however (at the time of writing, it is polling in the low 
single digits). UK public opinion on EU membership has 
been considerably less stable than the EU average, 
but other members, too, have experienced sustained 
periods of popular dissatisfaction with the EU, including 
Sweden and Denmark.2  The latter, incidentally, has as 
many opt-outs from the EU Treaties as the UK does. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis has seen the EU widely 
blamed for its repercussions across the most affected 
countries, and its support has nosedived accordingly. 
The one aspect that appears to genuinely set the UK 
apart from its EU peers is the largely unchallenged 
predominance of a starkly Eurosceptic discourse in the 
print media, which not only exerts extensive influence on 
the formation of public and political opinion, but frames 
the entire debate (cf. Hawkins 2012). Yet overall, the 
distinctiveness of British Euroscepti-cism appears to 
be more a matter of degree than of kind.
 Second, British Euroscepticism is not exactly a new 
phenomenon, and the EC/EU has managed to work with 
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it ever since Britain’s accession in 1973 – as well as with 
the challenges occasionally presented by other member 
states (including, but not limited to, negative referen¬da 
on Treaties, sensitive Constitutional Courts and un-
democratic tendencies). Britain’s partners coped with its 
insistence, barely two years after entering, to renegoti-
ate its terms of accession and have them approved by 
a national referendum in 1975. They postponed the first 
di¬rect elections to the European Parliament for a year 
because domestic resistance had rendered the British 
government unable to pass the requisite legislation in 
time for the originally envisaged date in 1978.  They 
appeased an irate Margaret Thatcher by approving, in 
1984, an unprecedented rebate on British membership 
dues. They saw off John Major’s threats of a second 
empty chair crisis in 1996, maintaining the BSE-induced 
ban on British beef for 10 years. They welcomed New 
Labour with open arms, accepted its step back from 
the single currency but denied it the coveted access to 
the Eurogroup. Now they are watching, with resigned 
apprehension, to what extent the Liberal Democrats 
can contain the rising tide of Eurosceptics inside the 
Conservative Party, their coalition partner.
 But there are enough Europhiles in Britain and 
enough Anglophiles in the rest of the EU to remain 
confident that, whatever next challenge the UK offers, 
the Community will work with it.
Doreen K. Allerkamp
Universität Mannheim
Notes
 “Nigel Farage blasts ‘fascist’ protesters after Edinburgh 
confrontation”, BBC News Scotland, May 17, 2013, 
http://www. bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-22566183; 
“Nigel Farage and Alex Salmond trade insults in battle 
of nationalists”, The Guar¬dian, May 17, 2013, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/may/17/nigel-farage-
alex-salmond.
  These tendencies can be observed by comparing the 
results from the Eurobarometer question, “Generally 
speaking, do you think that (your country’s) member-
ship of the European Community (Common Market) is 
...?”, to which the answer options are a good/bad thing, 
neither, or don’t know, across time and member states.
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Comparing Theoretical Frameworks of 
the EU Policy Process
Nikolaos Zahariadis*
 There have been numerous attempts to systemati-
cally study EU policy. Despite considerable movement, 
however, there has not been much movement forward. 
Frameworks dedicated to explaining EU policy remain 
for the most part theoretically underdeveloped and 
empirically incomplete. Many deal more broadly with 
European integration. Mimicking policy studies at the 
national level, others operate in theoretical silos or are 
content to focus on functional areas, such as trade or 
education, with little regard or interest in developments 
across policy sectors. 
 In an upcoming special issue of the Journal of Eu-
ropean Public Policy (2013), several members of the 
public policy section part ways with this way of theoriz-
ing. Contributors assess seven promising frameworks 
of the EU policy process in parallel, taking stock of their 
strengths and limitations. Key assumptions, variables, 
and their underlying logic are clarified and explored. 
Hypotheses and their key EU applications are then 
reviewed with an eye toward assessing the conditions 
under which lenses (frameworks or perspectives) enjoy 
high explanatory and predictive power. The aim is to 
help scholars make good analytical choices, address-
ing new and old EU problems in historically contingent 
environments. To help further develop robust research 
agendas, lenses are compared based on where they 
stand on issue and institutional complexity. 
 The contributions have considerable value-added. 
First, this is the first systematic analysis of different 
frameworks of the EU policy process. Second, the 
contributors speak to each other and to theoretical 
developments in the broader field of policy studies, 
generating a fertile dialogue that transcends the narrow 
confines of EU policy. Third, choice is viewed as a menu 
of alternative explanations and methodologies with dif-
ferent trade-offs and not as a right or wrong answer to 
a given problem. 
Competing or Complementary Explanations?
 Allison’s (1971) classic study of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis revealed the merit of applying different perspec-
tives to understand the same case. At one level, each 
perspective answers the same question. It contains 
a different logic of explanation and assigns different 
weight to relevant factors. Assessing the explanatory 
power of each perspective enables the analyst not only 
to gain a better grasp of how and why particular EU 
policy makers make the decisions they do, but it also 
sheds light into predicting what kind of decisions other 
policy makers are likely to make in the future.
 At another level, however, different lenses answer 
different questions. As Allison (1971, 251) claims: 
Spectacles magnify one set of factors rather than 
another and thus not only lead analysts to produce 
different explanations of problems that appear, in 
their summary questions, to be the same, but also 
influence the character of the analyst’s puzzle, the 
evidence he assumes to be relevant, the concepts 
he uses to examine the evidence, and what he 
takes to be an explanation.
 The point behind competing versus complementary 
perspectives is far from trivial. Most analysts who sys-
tematically assess the explanatory power of different 
perspectives tend to view perspectives as competing. 
But analyses are often pitched at different levels (Pe-
terson 2001), making them complementary. Carefully 
specifying assumptions and identifying the conditions 
under which each perspective yields insight are crucial 
steps in understanding the complexity of making policy.
Institutional and Issue Complexity
 The EU policy process is highly complex. Institutions 
now have to deal with 27 national systems, each with 
its own traditions, institutions, styles, values, and time-
tables. Differences need to be addressed and somehow 
reconciled in order for policy to be made. Given the 
complexity of EU rules, procedures, and jurisdictional 
boundaries, what is surprising is not whether EU deci-
sions are right (or not) but the fact that any decisions 
are made at all!
 Complexity refers to the nature of interaction among 
distinct units or parts of a system. Interaction takes 
place horizontally (among EU institutions and transna-
tional actors) and vertically (between EU and national 
and sub-national actors). Highly complex systems are 
characterized by free flowing information across many 
units with planned or unexpected feedback loops which 
are not immediately comprehensible (Zahariadis 2003). 
 Complexity has two dimensions: issue and insti-
tutional. Issue complexity refers to the amount and 
nature of informational linkages. How much informa-
tion is needed for an issue to be properly understood? 
How many links are made across issues? What type 
of information do we need to have before we can start 
tackling a particular problem? Institutional complexity 
refers to a multitude of rules governing close interac-
tions among a large number of structurally differentiated 
units across different organizational levels. It contains 
such design features as branching, cycling, asynchrony, 
multi-directionality, and overlap that provide ample op-
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section 
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portunities for frames of success and failure to jump 
across sub-systemic boundaries.
 Complexity has four implications for the study of 
EU policy. First, increasing complexity raises cost 
because more actors are involved and in different, 
potentially contradictory ways. Although expertise and 
competence affect EU agency autonomy (Wonka and 
Rittberger 2010), more autonomous agencies naturally 
place more demands on resources. Second, complex-
ity begets complexity. Although it is monetarily costlier, 
it is politically more expedient to add new or more 
rules and processes onto existing ones especially if 
costs are widely distributed through national budgets. 
Third, higher complexity gives rise to political conflict. 
More information and unanticipated feedbacks create 
overlapping and nested institutional jurisdictions that 
give rise to power struggles for control of agendas and 
resources. Fourth, complexity safeguards diversity. If 
“united in diversity” is a key EU aim, citizens and their 
national leaders have incentives to sustain complex 
processes in the hope of saving national idiosyncra-
sies and values from the homogenizing pressures of 
economies of scale. 
Seven Frameworks of the Policy Process
 The list is not exhaustive, but it contains promising 
frameworks: multi-level governance, advocacy coali-
tions, punctuated equilibrium, multiple streams, policy 
learning, normative power Europe, and constructivism. 
Selection was based on the range of assumptions each 
framework makes, the number of articles and/or books 
that have used the lens, ability to speak to the broader 
policy literature, and the potential scholars claim it has 
in explaining EU policy. We did not include principal-
agent approaches largely because there are very good 
reviews already in print (e.g., Pollack 2007; Kassim and 
Menon 2003). Readers are familiar with some of the 
hypotheses and strengths of each lens. They are invited 
to reflect on the limitations and the robust research 
agendas outlined by each contributor.
 Lenses fall into one of four quadrants of institutional 
and issue complexity. Multi-level governance (MLG), 
principal-agent models, and the advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) assume high levels of institutional 
complexity and low levels of issue complexity. Stephen-
son highlights the trajectory of the MLG lens, noting the 
different phases and comparative applications utilizing 
the concepts of institutions, identity, and delegation. 
Interestingly, Rozbicka reveals the similarities in terms 
of handling institutional complexity but also notes ACF’s 
contribution of belief systems in forming coalitions that 
cut across institutions.
 Conversely, Saurugger showcases constructiv-
ism’s capacity to handle issue complexity with relative 
ease. Adding nuance to the large epistemological tent 
occupied by constructivists, Saurugger discusses the 
various ways actors use ideas to act strategically in 
EU policy. Although institutional complexity does not 
feature prominently in constructivist work, several ways 
are identified to link ideas to institutions. 
 Princen argues that punctuated equilibrium (PE) 
is perhaps the only approach that can handle both 
institutional and issue complexity quite well. He notes, 
however, its limitation exists thus far in methodologi-
cal pitfalls and diversity of conceptualizations of policy 
change. Sharing similarities with PE, multiple streams 
reinforces its ability to handle issue complexity. But 
the latter’s limitation, as Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 
discuss, lies in its relative inattention to the EU’s insti-
tutional complexity.
 Finally, Radaelli and Dunlop investigate four ex-
amples of policy learning and draw implications for the 
study of EU policy. One lesson that permeates their 
analysis points to the need for institutional design as 
a mechanism facilitating and constraining learning. 
Coming from a different theoretical tradition but sharing 
constructivism’s focus on normative framing, Birchfield 
examines the analytical utility of the normative power 
Europe approach. Although somewhat limited to mainly 
transnational issues, the approach nevertheless high-
lights the great value and considerable difficulty with 
investigating complex institutions and issues. 
All contributors stress the need to use additional lenses 
to supplement the explanatory power of each individual 
framework. But how can we do that?
Which Way Forward?
 Richardson (2006, 25) claims “the complexity of 
the EU policy process means that we must learn to 
live with multiple models and learn to utilize concepts 
from a range of models in order to help us describe it 
as accurately as possible.” John (2003) prefers a syn-
thetic approach to studying policy whereby analysts 
utilize an eclectic mix of concepts. We chart a third 
way. It specifies which lenses to use and when based 
on what the different frameworks say through the filters 
of institutional and issue complexity. 
 The strategy begins by identifying areas of similari-
ties and differences among lenses. Frameworks that 
share critical assumptions on one or both dimensions 
may be viewed as competing explanations of the same 
phenomenon. Explanatory or predictive power may be 
empirically assessed by testing lenses side by side in 
an effort to ascertain which lens explains and predicts 
more with less. Frameworks with significant differences 
may be considered complementary because they ask 
fundamentally different questions. They may not be 
fruitfully compared because they illuminate different 
aspects of policy and are applicable under different 
conditions. For example, multi-level governance and 
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punctuated equilibrium approaches may be viewed 
as competing on issues involving higher institutional 
complexity. Policy learning and multiple streams are 
complementary as they diverge on assumptions about 
complex institutions and issues.
 Research may test and replicate the empirical valid-
ity of our claim. This can be done with a nested “most/
least likely” case design similar to Jubilee, Caporaso, 
and Checkel’s (2003) two dialogues: domain of ap-
plicability (to fully specify conditions and expectations) 
and then competitive testing (to assess explanatory 
and predictive power). Our contribution lies in propos-
ing complexity as the lynchpin that holds the agenda 
together. The design involves selecting cases where 
the lens is expected to fit and then a range of cases 
where it does not. For example, constructivism and 
multiple streams may be positioned to explain the highly 
complex issue of the current financial crisis. They can 
then be paired to examine employment schemes under 
cohesion policy, an area of high institutional complexity, 
and decisions to save endangered species, an area of 
lower institutional complexity. Results isolate the effects 
of institutions and highlight limitations regarding issue 
complexity. The aim is to identify limitations under simi-
lar conditions in order to clearly ascertain the trade-offs 
each lens makes between explanatory and predictive 
power. Competing lenses can then be rank-ordered, 
subsumed, or discarded.
 The next step is to improve what each lens lacks by 
relaxing its assumptions and using different analytical 
techniques to clarify its logic or confirm its hypotheses. 
Complementary lenses may be used to more clearly 
describe different aspects of the same issue and more 
accurately explain or predict policy outcomes. Not ev-
eryone will agree with our choices and claims, but we 
are convinced the effort to prove us wrong will not only 
advance the state of policy theory but also help build 
better frameworks of the EU policy process.
Nikolaos Zahariadis
University of Alabama at Birmingham
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Income Inequality, Parliamentary Elections, 
and the Recent Economic Crisis
Florence Bouvet and Sharmila King
 There has been general increasing dissatisfaction 
with the growing income gap between the rich and poor 
in Western countries. In a recent study conducted by 
the World Economic Forum1  in 2013, severe income 
inequality is ranked one of the biggest risks facing the 
world.  One example of the dissatisfaction among the 
electorate is the “Occupy Wall Street” protests that 
emerged from the recent US banking and financial 
crisis. The slogan of the “Occupy” movement - “We are 
the 99% and we will no longer tolerate the greed and 
corruption of the 1%”- is indicative of the frustration 
among many with the electoral process.  In Europe, 
the financial crisis was soon followed by a debt crisis 
which is still unresolved to date.  There protests have 
emerged following the austerity measures undertaken 
in order to receive bailout funds from the European 
Troika (European Union, International Monetary Fund, 
and European Central Bank), as some government 
redistributive policies have been cut, which could pos-
sibly lead to an increase in income inequality. 
 As a result, the recent economic crisis played a 
significant role during the last elections in the US and 
Europe. Between 2008 and 2012, out of the 35 parlia-
mentary elections were held in the 27 OECD countries, 
only 8 incumbent leading parties have remained the 
first parties in their respective national governments.2 
However, during times of severe economic crisis, the 
electorate may not hold the incumbent party as account-
able, especially if the crisis is viewed as an exogenous 
event.  Rather, voters may vote prospectively and sup-
port the party with policies that best solve or mitigate 
the crisis (see Palmer and Whitten (2011), Anderson 
and Hecht (2012), Bellucci et al. (2012) and Lewis-Beck 
and Nadeau (2012), Scotto (2012)).  
 While there is an extensive literature on economic 
voting (see Lewis-Beck, 1988 and Lewis-Beck and 
Steigmaier, 2000 for a review of this literature) that finds 
that economic developments, notably economic growth, 
unemployment, and inflation, affect electoral outcomes, 
no  paper has extensively examined the relationship 
between income inequality and election outcomes. 
To fill this gap in the past literature, we use data on 
parliamentary elections in OECD countries between 
1975 and 2012 to analyze the relationship between 
the vote shares of incumbent government parties and 
income inequality. Income inequality is measured with 
Gini coefficients obtained from the Luxembourg Income 
Study. In addition to our measure of income inequality, 
we assess the economic performance of the country 
with four macroeconomic variables typically included in 
voting function: the inflation rate,3 the unemployment 
rate, the growth rate in per capita real income, and the 
openness to trade.4 
 Besides economic outcomes, we also control for 
three national institutional dimensions. The first one is 
a measure of government fractionalization. It is equal 
to the probability that two deputies picked at random 
from among the government parties will be of differ-
ent parties. It is used to control for the complexity of 
government coalition. The more fragmented a govern-
ment is, the more difficult it is for the voters to hold a 
specific party accountable for the national economic 
performance. An alternative strategy would consist on 
including a dummy variable for single-party or a dummy 
for coalition governments (Chappell and Veiga, 2000). 
However, the latter for instance would not distinguish 
between a two-party coalition and a four-party where 
political responsibility is relative less easy to establish. 
We also control for multi-level governance by adding a 
dummy variable equal to one when a country includes 
autonomous regions, and zero otherwise. “An autono-
mous region is recorded if a source explicitly mentions 
a region, area, or district that is autonomous or self-
governing. Furthermore, they must be constitution-
ally designated as “autonomous” or “independent” or 
“special”.” (Keefer, 2010, page 21).5 If regions are self-
governing, it is then more difficult for voters to assess 
whether the central/federal government or the regional 
governments bear more responsibility for the economic 
outcomes of the country (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Finally, 
we control for the number of years a government has 
been in office, as “older” governments should be held 
more accountable (Chappell and Veiga, 2000).
 We use the aforementioned dataset to test four hy-
potheses. First, we expect to find evidence of economic 
voting, and more particularly, that voters are less likely 
to vote for an incumbent party if the unemployment and 
inflation rates increased, and if the country experienced 
an economic downturn during their term. Second, we 
expect an increase in income inequality to lower the 
vote share to incumbent parties. Our third hypothesis 
relates to the political impact of trade openness. Inso-
far as more open economies are more likely to be af-
fected by external shocks, their incumbent governments 
should be held less accountable for the performance of 
the national economy than in countries with relatively 
more closed economies (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Duch and 
Stevenson, 2008; Palmer and Whitten, 2011). To test 
this hypothesis, we interact the openness to trade 
variable with the inequality measure (Gini coefficient) 
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and the other three macroeconomic indicators (the 
unemployment rate, inflation rate, and annual growth 
rate in real per capita income). If our null hypothesis is 
true, then the coefficients on the interaction terms with 
unemployment, inflation, and income inequality should 
be positive, while the coefficient on the interaction term 
with economic growth should be negative.
 Because the recent economic downturn has been 
the longest and the most severe recession experienced 
by OECD countries over the last 30 years, this crisis 
and notably its global dimension has “severely chal-
lenged the capacity of governments to steer the national 
economy and has had a strong impact on their elec-
toral support” (Bellucci et al., 2012; page 469). Since 
2008, only 8 incumbent leading parties in the countries 
included in this analysis have remained the first parties 
in their respective national governments. With these 
stylized facts in mind, we examine whether the recent 
economic crisis induced a shift in economic voting, and 
whether this shift is affected by the degree of openness 
of the national economies. To that end, we add to our 
model a time dummy variable equals for 2008 and on-
wards. We then interact this dummy variable with the 
macroeconomic variables and the inequality variable, 
as well as with the interaction terms between the open-
ness variables and the other four economic variables. A 
negative coefficient on the crisis dummy variable would 
indicate that, everything else equal, incumbent parties 
have benefited from less support since 2008, and thus 
that there is some asymmetry in economic voting. This 
leads to our fourth hypothesis. On the one hand, if the 
crisis exacerbates economic voting, then the coeffi-
cients should be negative on the interaction terms with 
unemployment, income inequality, and inflation, while 
it should be positive for economic growth. On the other 
hand, if voters judge that the global dimension of the 
crisis diminished the capacity of governments to steer 
the national economy, and should therefore be held less 
accountable, then the coefficients would have opposite 
signs to those discussed above.
 Given the numerous interaction terms included in 
the specification, we report in the table below the overall 
effects of the macroeconomic indicators and of the crisis 
dummy variable.
 Starting with the crisis dummy, we find that, holding 
everything else constant, the vote share of government 
parties was 29.6 percentage points lower than before 
2008.   Turning to the central variable of our paper, 
namely income inequality, we find that prior to the recent 
economic downturn, a change in income inequality is 
negatively associated with the total vote share of gov-
ernment parties: a 1-percentage point increase or one 
unit in the Gini coefficient (which is a 3.2% increase) 
is associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease 
(equivalent to a 3% decrease) in vote share. For the 
period starting in 2008, we find that a 1-percentage point 
increase or one unit increase in inequality, everything 
else constant, is associated with an increase by 8.6 
percentage points and almost 9 percentage points in 
the vote share of government parties and of the leading 
party respectively. Consequently, voters have not been 
penalizing incumbent governments for rising income 
inequality. As suggested in Palmer and Whitten (2011), 
“During periods of severe economic crisis, however, 
economic voting might be attenuated as a result of 
voters discounting the economic outcomes as being 
disconnected from past policy choices” (page 428).
 Out of the other three macroeconomic variables, 
the unemployment rate appears to be the most robust 
element of economic voting, before and after the cri-
sis. Before 2008, a one-percentage point increase in 
unemployment is associated with a 0.98-percentage 
point decrease in the vote share for the government. 
Following the recent economic crisis, voters have held 
        Vote share of all government parties
Unemployment  before 2008      -0.984
     since 2008      -12.584
Income Inequality  before 2008      -1.264
      since 2008      8.625
Inflation rate   before 2008     Statist. insignificant
      since 2008     Statist. Insignificant
Economic growth  before 2008     Statist. Insignificant
      since 2008      33.140
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incumbent governments even more accountable for 
increases in unemployment. A one-percentage point 
increase in unemployment is now associated with a 12 
percentage-point decrease in vote share for all the par-
ties in the incumbent government. Because unemploy-
ment rose significantly in Europe’s periphery (Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain, and Greece), we checked whether this 
last result was driven by unemployment developments 
in these four countries. When we exclude them from 
our sample, we find that since 2008, a one-percentage 
point increase in unemployment rate is associated with 
a 22 percentage point decrease in vote share for all the 
parties in the incumbent government. 
 We find no statistically significant relation between 
vote share and the inflation rate, which is not due to 
multicollinearity because correlations with economic 
growth and unemployment are low. This lack of signifi-
cant statistical relationship might be due to the relatively 
low and stable inflation rates that most OECD coun-
tries have enjoyed since the late 1980s. Finally, while 
growth in real per capita income was not determinant 
prior to 2008, it becomes so during the downturn: a 
one percentage point increase in the growth rate of 
per capita income is associated with an increase in the 
vote share by 33 percentage points for the government 
parties. This large effect indicates that votes would 
have strongly rewarded a government able to deliver 
economic growth during the global recession. Regard-
ing our third hypothesis, the positive coefficients on 
the openness-unemployment interaction terms indicate 
that, before and during the crisis, economic voting on 
the issue of unemployment is smaller, the more open 
the national economy.  The negative coefficient on the 
crisis-openness-Gini interaction term reveals that the 
opposite is true for income inequality.
 Overall, the downturn might have augmented eco-
nomic voting in terms of unemployment and economic 
growth by heightening the salience of these issues, 
notably because this recession is one of the most 
severe economic downturns that these countries have 
experienced since WWII. Our analysis suggests that 
voters did not discount the recent economic crisis as a 
complete exogenous shock, since they held incumbent 
governments more accountable for the deterioration in 
national labor markets conditions. Yet, they acknowl-
edge that international economic interdependence 
potentially undermines the efficiency and efficacy of 
domestic stabilization policies. This result suggests that 
a severe economic crisis does not necessarily result in 
voters removing an incumbent party from office.  
Notes
1 http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013
2 Canada in 2011, Chile in 2009, Greece in 2012, Japan 
in 2009, Mexico in 2009 but then lost in 2012, Nether-
lands in 2012, Turkey in 2011 and the USA 2012.
3 The inflation rate is measured as the annual percent-
age change in the consumer price index (the OECD: 
http://stats.oecd.org). To avoid that few outlying obser-
vations drive our results, we exclude from the estima-
tions inflation rates higher than 50 %.
4  Openness to trade is the sum of exports and imports 
expressed relative to total GDP, from the Penn World 
Table 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012).
 
5  The following countries included in our sample have 
autonomous regions: Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, and the 
USA.
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EU as a Global Actor Interest Section
Transforming European Diplomacy Abroad: 
Insights from Washington
Heidi Maurer 
 The emerging system of European diplomacy, the 
establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and its impact on Brussels have gained consid-
erable attention by researchers. This short contribution, 
in contrast, focuses on the transformation of European 
diplomatic practice on the ground in Washington. By 
drawing on empirical insights from 40 interviews,1 the 
paper highlights emerging coordination mechanisms 
and the role of the EU Delegation in the upgraded sys-
tem of European diplomatic representation towards the 
US. 
High-profile European presence in Washington´s 
competitive diplomatic environment 
 Washington is the most important diplomatic repre-
sentation for many countries, and the presence of one 
of the largest diplomatic corps adds to Washington´s 
special political flair, with deliberations moving rapidly 
from one topic to the next. Gaining attention of the US 
administration and remaining visible thus results in a 
constant “beauty contest” among diplomats.
 In terms of European diplomatic presence, Wash-
ington is one of the few capitals next to Beijing and 
Moscow (Austermann 2012: 3) where all EU member 
states are represented. There are close to 700 Euro-
pean accredited diplomats in Washington (27 member 
states plus Croatia),2 with numbers varying considerably 
between member states. Germany (136), the UK (116) 
and France (56) hold the strongest diplomatic presence, 
followed by Italy (41), Spain (35), and the Netherlands 
(32), while Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus account for 
2-4 diplomats each. Additionally, it is the four biggest 
member states embassies that have a vast number 
of seconded experts and local staff at their disposal: 
considering overall embassy personnel, the UK reaches 
up to 450 staff, France close to 300, Germany 250 and 
Italy up to 230.
 It was also in Washington, where the ECSC had 
in 1954 opened its first external presence, before the 
EC delegation received full diplomatic status in 1971. 
Washington became also the first upgraded EU delega-
tion post-Lisbon (EU Observer 2010). With close to 
35 diplomats and a total of 90 staff, the EU delegation 
compares to a medium-sized member states embassy, 
ranging after the UK, France, Germany and Italy clearly 
ahead of other member states.3
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The EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to 
announce the online publication of the first EUSA 
Biennial Conference Special Issue of the Journal 
of European Public Policy (JEPP). This Special 
Issue includes seven (revised) papers selected 
by peer review from amongst those nominated 
by discussants and chairs as among the best pre-
sented at 2011 Biennial EUSA conference. The 
Special Issue can be found at http://www.tand-
fonline.com. The paper version is now available. 
We look forward to continuing this collabo-
ration between JEPP and EUSA in the fu-
ture and expect that 6-8 papers from the 
2013 EUSA Conference, May 9-11, 2013, 
to be held in the Baltimore/Washington DC 
metro area, will again be selected for publi-
cation in a future special JEPP/EUSA issue.
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The system of European diplomatic representation 
in flux 
 The Lisbon Treaty was meant to provide for a more 
coherent, more efficient and more unitary presence of 
the EU in international affairs. With the creation of the 
EEAS, former European Commission delegations were 
upgraded to EU delegations, which represent the EU 
abroad and “shall act in close cooperation with Member 
States´ diplomatic and consular missions” (Art. 221 
TFEU). 
 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the two separately kept 
strands of European interest representation showed 
hardly any interaction in Washington: the rotating 
presidency represented the EU-27 politically towards 
the US and was in charge of member states coordina-
tion, while the Commission delegation represented 
EU competences (especially trade). Putting an end to 
the external representation by the rotating presidency 
after Lisbon, these tasks were shifted to the EU del-
egation. It was, however, not predetermined how this 
new arrangement would impact on existing diplomatic 
practises on the ground.
 The appointment of former Commission president 
chief of staff Vale de Almeida as EU ambassador to 
the US in autumn 2010 caused resentment with some 
member states who would have preferred to see a 
national diplomat at this post (EU Observer 2010). Yet, 
and perhaps even because of this difficult starting po-
sition, Almeida repeatedly emphasised during his first 
weeks in Washington that he is not intending to interfere 
with member states bilateral relations (Washington 
Times 2010) and that the post-Lisbon arrangement 
would only work if the “new” delegation were of use to 
member states. Hence, instead of just working “in close 
cooperation” with member states, the EU delegation in 
Washington situated itself deliberately and strongly as 
service provider for member states. 
 “To be of service to the member states”: a new 
role for the upgraded EU delegation 
 In the past, presidencies had organised regular 
meetings of ambassadors and deputies (Taylor 1980). 
The quantity and quality of those meetings, however, 
depended largely on the commitment and the resources 
of the country holding the presidency. During 2010, the 
delegation gradually took over the organisation and 
chairing of those meetings and extended this practice 
into an elaborate and institutionalised system of coor-
dination, with regular meetings at various diplomatic 
levels.
 Meetings on the highest level remained: once per 
month the EU ambassador invites member states 
ambassadors for a breakfast meeting at his residence. 
Yet, it is the weekly meetings of the deputy chief of mis-
sions that are now considered the linchpin of member 
states coordination. In addition, the regular meetings on 
sectoral issues were reinvigorated, to provide a forum 
for member states discussion of specific questions, 
but even more so for debriefings of member states 
by US administration guest speaker on current topics. 
Press officers, consular diplomats and other sectoral 
formations meet now at least once per month, while 
economic counsellors meet every two weeks. Most 
regularly, at least once per week, political counsellors 
convene, although their schedule is heavily influenced 
by external events, with possible 3-4 meetings during 
busy weeks.
 European diplomats appreciate this regular possibil-
ity to stay informed about current issues and to get to 
know member states positions. But even more so, they 
emphasise the added value that debriefings with US 
guests have for their daily work in providing an efficient 
and timesaving way to gather information. Especially 
diplomats from small and medium-sized embassies 
would not be in the position to cover on their own the 
vast array of different topics. Additionally they highlight 
that the “EU-27 convening power” provides them with 
access to higher-ranking US officials, which they would 
not gain in a bilateral approach and would not be able 
to organise in such a regular manner. Member states 
appreciate, moreover, the increased sharing of reports 
by the delegation, about political US developments, 
discussions in Congress, or also recent developments 
in Brussels. Also debriefings organised after meetings of 
EU actors with US officials are valued highly by member 
states diplomats.
Conclusion 
Considering the political importance of Washington 
for member states, the historically strong stance of 
the delegation in trade issues and thus the potential 
for conflict within the changing system of European 
diplomatic representation, the transformation in Wash-
ington during the last three years has been perceived 
as rather smoothly by involved actors. The latter also 
highlight the need for more patience to let the new 
system get fine-tuned and fall fully into place. Member 
states also pragmatically assess the fact that small and 
medium-sized embassies profit considerably more from 
the new service-orientated role of the delegation. Also 
they emphasise that the new development must not 
be mistaken for integration or diminishing of bilateral 
diplomatic efforts. Rather the European diplomatic pres-
ence in Washington post-Lisbon should be perceived as 
transforming into a multi-layered and multi-dimensional 
system that is based on regular and intense coordina-
tion mechanisms between EU actors (i.e. member 
states and EU delegation). The question thus is not if the 
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EU delegation in Washington in specific terms is able to 
take over from member states, but rather how bilateral 
member states efforts, EU delegation activities and a 
close coordination of both is going to represent the EU 
and its member in the best positive manner in the US. 
Heidi Maurer
Johns Hopkins University
Notes
1 This project was conducted during October 2012 
and June 2013 in the framework of the Austrian 
Marshall Plan Foundation Fellowship 2012-13 at the 
Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at SAIS in 
Washington DC. I also want to thank all interview 
partners for their generous support in sharing their 
experience.
2 Data taken from the Diplomatic List of the State De-
partment (version fall 2012, retrieved from http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/198844.pdf
3 In 2010 the European Parliament, additionally, 
established the European Parliament Liaison Office 
in Washington, with up to 9 staff members, with the 
objective to establish fruitful and favourable relations 
with Congress, also in order to strengthen the trans-
atlantic legislators´ dialogue.
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Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing 
European Influence in a Changing World
David Garcia Cantalapiedra
 The European Union is embarked in a difficult and 
tortuous path in defining itself and its role in a chang-
ing international system that, dubiously, will respond to 
the international framework built by Western countries 
since the end of the Second World War and after the 
end of the Cold War. As Hedley Bull wrote about the 
different orders in the international system, an Interna-
tional Order and World Order, the latter seems not to be 
structured as he established in his book The Anarchical 
Society 35 years ago, on a system based on Western 
values, rules and principles.1 Because of this, the next 
months will be a key momentum in Europe for different 
reasons: the German Parliamentarian election and the 
European Council in December could mark the fate of 
the Euro, the EU economic and institutional project, and 
the EU’s role in the World.
 As the presentation of the report says, “the Eu-
ropean Global Strategy project was initiated by the 
foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden in 
July 2012 in a bid to foster and structure debate about 
the European Union’s role as a global actor at a time 
of sweeping international changes”. This effort tries to 
reflect some debate and, to a certain point, guidance, 
from the academic and civil society point of view. The 
final result has been a report called “Towards a Euro-
pean Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in 
a changing World.”2 Thus, there has been an effort from 
20 European foundations and think-tanks but carried 
out mainly by four of them: International Affairs Insti-
tute (IAI), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PI 
SM), the Elcano Royal Institute (RIE) and the Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs (UI ). The document is 
trying to offer a view about the challenges faced by the 
EU and some ideas about the role and policies that the 
EU should undertake to firmly establish the European 
Union in that changing international system. Thus, the 
effort to develop a proposal for a “Grand Strategy” for 
the European Union must be recognized and congratu-
lated for the difficulty of the task, the creation of working 
groups at this level and the conciliation of ideas, men-
talities, perceptions, interests and procedures across 
Europe. To summarize, the report is structured in three 
main parts:
- An introduction and a chapter for Values and Inter-
ests. Both offer a world vision that is necessary for a 
Grand Strategy. 
- Then, the largest part and the core of the report, 
Strategic Interests.
- Finally, a part related to Capabilities and Instru-
ments.
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As the executive summary establishes, there are six 
“European vital interests” identified in the report. These 
will be secured by 11 strategic objectives. From this 
point of view, this analysis goes across the board and 
also tries to debate the relation among some of the 
conceptions established there. One of the key elements 
of the report would be what is the EU’s world vision and 
mission; how the EU sees the international system and 
what the EU stands for. This probably should be the 
most important part of a Grand Strategy because it will 
define values and vital and strategic interests, and the 
policies and strategies to defend and carry them out. It is 
notable also what the report does not say. For example, 
EU “doctrinal” language has almost disappeared from 
the report: normative power, civil power, soft power, 
and human security. 
 The first “programmatic” problem is that at the very 
beginning of the introduction, the European Union is 
defined as an economic bloc, with a large population 
and the EU/Member States duality. To define Values 
and Interests, it is necessary to talk beyond the eco-
nomic and structure realm. Although there are some 
useful approaches later, it is imperative to reaffirm the 
present and future strengths of the integration process 
toward “more Europe”, but not perhaps in terms of more 
institutionalization but more democratization through a 
real elected presidency and parliament, demonstrating 
a clear political will and the wish to lead. This is not only 
the problem of the “identity”, but the management of 
this “identity” and other actors’ perceptions. Images and 
symbols are related to power and capabilities, at least 
for certain rising actors. In this vein, the term “influence” 
in the main title of the report would not work only in terms 
of values or capacity to set rules and regimes, where 
the EU has had a powerful capacity until now, which 
in this new international dynamic could be starting to 
vanish. The ability to influence does not demonstrate 
multipolarity per se either.  The will to lead shows abil-
ity and capabilities to decide, and this could create, to 
certain point, “other centres of power”, a feature found 
in multipolar systems. This posture held by the report 
is problematic because the use of the term in Interna-
tional Relations Theory and for political practitioners 
has been widely discussed, and its meaning or even 
usefulness, criticized.3 However, even in both realms, 
it is still profusely used, in terms of the negation of 
unipolarity and /or to reaffirm the EU and other rising 
actors’ role. The report really sides with the idea of a 
trend to multipolarity, but it also envisages a strong 
regional vision, rather than a global vocation, not only 
for the concept of “Strategic Neighborhood”, but for the 
deployment of the concept. There are other strategic 
visions as the US Pivot or the “Greater Middle East”, the 
Russian “Near Abroad” or the Chinese “Strategic Fron-
tier”, but as instruments of power projection or global 
capacity, not as a limiting mechanism of responsibility 
and capability, although the report seems to expresses 
ideas of interaction not only with states but also with 
non-states actors and societies. This posture could be 
realistic at short term, due to the economic crisis but is 
strategically blind in long term vision, due to the overlap-
ping areas of interest (and friction) with other powers 
as Middle East-Persian Gulf, Caucasus-Central Asia 
or even the Mediterranean, Sahel-Horn of Africa. In 
this situation, and from a realist perspective, the report 
faces the necessity to reinforce or re-create alliances 
with the United States or with other members from the 
former West (Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, 
etc). This is very interesting because the creation or 
re-creation of alliances respond to an idea for rebal-
ancing the system against a hegemonic challenger, a 
coalition of states, for security or for influence, among 
others. The idea is to reinforce the former “Unipolarity 
Club” (the former “West”), and to accommodate when 
needed (lack of support or interest by the United States) 
to other great powers as Russia and China. This pos-
ture in vital regions as Middle East-Persian Gulf and 
Caucasus-Central Asia is not sustainable. The lack of 
real capacity in these areas, as demonstrated during 
the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, demonstrates 
a lack of coherence between Vital Interests, Strategic 
Neighborhood and Capabilities and Instruments.
 Thus, regarding this last chapter and the security 
conceptions found in the report, the main problem is 
not to define the structure of the international system 
as multipolar. It is to recognize that the security envi-
ronment has changed dramatically, not only because 
of several challenges, threats and different actors, but 
because the turn to an offense-dominance world, due 
to, above all, cyberwarfare and its integration with space 
systems, WMD, conventional global strike capabilities, 
and battlefield robotization and nanotechnology. This 
has changed for instance, the meaning (or even the 
utility) of deterrence and the ability for offense-defense 
differentiation. This, in a very dynamic international sys-
tem, with new alliances and alignments, lack of incen-
tives and reduced interest convergence, and increased 
competition, makes the international system prone to 
more offensive visions and doctrines, and aggressive 
postures even from an economic point of view. Thus, it 
is strange that these areas and their integration are not 
discussed in the report. In this vein, the second EU Vital 
Interest, a secure and resilient EU, security challenges 
and security threats are mixed: armed aggression, 
state failure, regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and 
natural hazards. This could be a threat misperception 
when a well-focused comprehensive security concept 
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is needed. It is not clear if it is a threat-centered or 
capabilities-centered concept, although the use of a 
comprehensive approach is expected. However, it 
seems the EU is to relinquish real operative capability 
to NATO. This final posture takes us again to the start 
of the report and of this analysis. Some of these ideas 
are not helping to create an image of a more proactive 
EU; it could also be more realist than in the past, but 
in certain positions, it prefers to accommodate.
David Garcia Cantalapiedra
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Notes
1 He defined ‘World order’’ as “the regimes of values, 
morals, and rights that extend to all mankind and in-
fuse the international order with a sense of justice and 
purpose. It connotes the complex of Western liberal 
international law and economics that is currently in-
stitutionalized through international organizations, like 
the United Nations. Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical 
Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd edition. 
New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 18-21.
 
2 The project website (www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu) 
contains all the materials gathered to date
3 See, for instance, in these different categories, some 
interesting reflections. Roberts, Adam. “International 
Relations after the Cold War”. International Affairs vol. 
84: nº2, 2008. Jervis, Robert. “Unipolarity. A Structural 
Perspective ”. World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 
2009). Hass, Richard. “The Age of no Polarity”. Foreign 
Affairs. May/June 2008.
Balfour, Rosa. Human Rights and Democracy in EU 
Foreign Policy. The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt. Lon-
don and New York: Routledge, 2012.
 One of the enduring challenges for the study of EU 
foreign policy is the gap between aims and actions. 
While EU trade practices display a very explicit ratio-
nale of pragmatism, the promotion of human rights and 
democracy poses the dilemma of taking actions based 
on ethical premises or pragmatic interests. The interna-
tional actorness of the EU has often been baptized as 
civilian, normative, transformative, smart or soft power. 
However, the EU performance is frequently evaluated 
negatively due its reluctance to criticize human rights 
failures in the world. This gap between goals and ac-
tions is the focus of the book published by Rosa Balfour.
 After outlining the structure of her research in the 
introduction, Balfour explains the analytical framework 
to study the discourse and the practices of human rights 
and democracy promotion in the EU foreign policy. The 
following six chapters symmetrically compare the case 
studies of Ukraine and Egypt by describing not only the 
implementation of human rights and democracy in both 
countries in areas such as elections, press freedom 
and torture, but also by analyzing the EU foreign policy 
towards both countries.
 While the book provides several contributions to 
explain the gap between goals and actions, three ex-
planations are highly relevant. The first is the selective 
application of the human rights clause in the EU foreign 
policy. In the view of the author, this clause has been in-
voked in cases where countries are of little economic or 
geostrategic interests to the EU, thus making the pursuit 
of a normative position costless for its member states. 
The second significant explanation is the clarification 
of the mismatch between the rhetoric and the action of 
the EU in responding to human rights and democracy 
shortcomings in Ukraine and Egypt. By supporting the 
status quo in Kiev and Cairo, the EU has placed stra-
tegic interests over human rights and democracy pro-
motion. The position of the EU towards Ukraine takes 
into consideration its relationship with Russia as well 
as its position as a transit country for Europe’s energy 
sources. In the case of Egypt, the author argues that 
the stability of Mubarak’s regime and his mostly friendly 
relations with the Arab, Islamic and non-Islamic worlds 
was a driving force in EU’s muted response to human 
rights abuse and non-democratic practices. In this point, 
policy makers will find this book pertinent as a reminder 
of the damage caused by the gap and contradictions 
EUSA members interested in reviewing recent 
EU-related books, please fill out the form for po-
tential reviewers located on our website-www.
eustudies.org.
Publishers should send a review copy
of books directly to the EUSA office, 415 Belle-
field Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 
PA 15206, USA
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between political discourses and tangible actions. 
 The third relevant explanation in the book is about 
the sources of the limits of the use of democracy and 
human rights promotion in the EU foreign policy, which 
stems from the logic of diversity of foreign policy goals 
among the member states. In the cases of Ukraine and 
Egypt the position of the EU members could be grouped 
as follows: a) the Northern EU states have been fairly 
consistent in pushing the EU to adopt strong norma-
tive positions; b) the new members states from Central 
Europe further strengthened the Northern position; and 
c) France, together with other countries like Italy and 
Spain, has been far less committed to developing nor-
mative positions and have valued the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states, and 
preferred privileged cooperation. This logic of diversity 
is also affected by the role that the European Commis-
sion can play as a policy shaper, while the EP can use 
its limited leverage through parliamentary questions.
 The empirical analysis of Balfour leads her to 
emphasize the explanatory power of classical realism 
from the International Relations Theory and embrace 
the intergovernmental perspective of Integration Stud-
ies. Thus, the role of member states as more effective 
agenda setters than the European Parliament or the 
European Commission is underscored in the conclu-
sion. While the book is a contribution to the study of 
EU foreign policy in general and democracy and human 
rights promotion in particular, it may leave a sense of 
dissatisfaction to scholars who emphasize constructivist 
perspectives. Even from that angle, the evidence pre-
sented by Balfour makes it clear that the transformative 
power of the EU is undermined when the promise of 
future membership is out of the table of negotiation. In 
sum, the perspective provided by this book gives schol-
ars a chance to conduct further research by comparing 
more cases in order to enhance the understanding of 
the limits of the EU in promoting democracy and human 
rights across the globe. 
Roberto Dominguez
European University Institute
Appel, Hilary. Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Global-
ization, Regional Integration and the Democratic Com-
promise. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.
 Taxation is a core-power of the state and key for 
the development of modern democracies. Traditional 
party lines developed along the question who in society 
had to pay how much to finance public spending. And 
yet the transformation of communist states into capital-
ist democracies saw very little partisan politics where 
tax policy was concerned. Professor Appel, who has 
published widely on fiscal politics in post-communist 
countries, starts from this puzzling observation and 
argues in her book that external factors have mostly 
shaped “Tax Politics in Eastern Europe”.  
 The main part of the book sets out with a description 
of the early post-communist period and the challenges 
politicians faced in transforming their economies. Under 
Soviet rule the state financed itself mainly by taxing 
large state-owned enterprises, which required little 
administrative capacity. The transformation towards a 
capitalist system, in which private economic activity by 
many actors had to be taxed, was further complicated 
by bad macro-economic conditions. Yet, politicians in 
Eastern Europe managed to implement revenue-gen-
erating tax systems without crippling economic growth. 
What factors influence which economic activities were 
taxed how much – national politics or international 
constraints?
 Appel offers a vivid description of the development 
of three major tax types. Relying both on interviews with 
major stakeholders as well as on statistical evidence 
she shows how distinct international influences shaped 
these – leaving almost no room for national politics in 
the case of value-added taxes (VAT) and corporate 
income taxes (CIT), yet allowing partisan differences to 
matter for personal income taxes (PIT). Chapter three 
illustrates with great detail how indirect taxation was al-
most not politicized at all. European integration required 
all member states to have a similar VAT system, thus 
the Eastern Europeans adopted the West European 
system with only a few, temporary exemptions (p. 52f). 
Regional and international integration also had a strong 
influence on corporate taxes. In four country studies 
(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) Ap-
pel highlights how politicians from all over the political 
spectrum lowered corporate tax rates to attract foreign 
investment. Chapter five tells the comprehensive story 
of the introduction  and spread of the flat income tax. 
Although Appel depicts the diffusion of the flat tax via 
policy learning as a way to compete in an international 
context with mobile capital, she emphasizes the role 
partisan politics played. Different to VAT and CIT, mostly 
politicians from the right introduced flat taxes, whereas 
politicians from the left were opposed to what they saw 
as progressivity reducing.
 In her last substantial chapter, Appel discusses the 
evolution of the tax system in Russia. Due to its size and 
oil wealth Russia is the least influenced by international 
factors. 
 The book is very well-written and nicely combines 
qualitative and quantitative evidence to arrive at a full 
picture of tax politics in Eastern Europe (and Russia). 
Having a background in comparative politics with a fo-
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cus on tax competition in the OECD, I read it with great 
interest. Hilary Appel provides much needed detail on 
tax policy outside the usually analyzed suspects. In 
line with newer research on spatial diffusion and tax 
competition, she also makes an important contribution 
by highlighting the role that international interdependen-
cies play for national policy making. 
 Yet, while I learned much from the main chapters, 
I cannot help but disagree with some of her bolder 
statements at the beginning of the book – although to 
be fair she weakens them in her own conclusion. As 
she herself states there was broad popular support for 
European integration (p. 152). Thus, the adoption of 
a VAT illustrates not “how the democratic process be-
came hollow due to external priorities” (p4), but rather 
a domestically demanded policy. Also the lowering of 
the corporate tax and the introduction of a flat income 
tax to attract foreign investors does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that (domestic) politics do not 
matter. As Appel herself notes, the Eastern European 
economies broadly gained from the increasing inflows 
of foreign capital (p.73, 79). In a democracy, parties can 
have common policy ideal points. Furthermore, learning 
from outside actors actually enhances domestic policy 
choices and as such is very different to international 
competition as again is coercion. Lastly, fiscal policy 
is much broader than tax policy. While external factors 
might constraint the way in which governments gener-
ate revenue, domestic politics can still determine its 
spending.
 In sum, Hilary Appel’s book on tax politics in Eastern 
Europe is an enjoyable read that paints a very detailed 
picture on the national and international challenges 
politicians in post-communist countries overcame to 
create the tax systems that we see today. The book 
has much to offer for the interested reader, as well as 
for scholars with a focus on Eastern Europe, European 
integration, tax politics or spatial interdependencies. 
Laura Seelkopf 
Jacobs University Bremen
Marquand, David. The End of the West: The Once 
and Future Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2011.
 Since the global financial crisis of 2008, Europe-
ans have had to confront a number of difficult ques-
tions about the future of the EU.  According to David 
Marquand, those questions that have most occupied 
Europeans have been fundamentally the wrong ones – 
the same type of wrong questions, moreover, that have 
distracted Europeans for decades.  The End of the West 
offers Marquand’s critical assessment of what Europe-
ans have done – and haven’t done – as the project of 
integration has drifted from its moorings.  The result 
is a thought-provoking reflection on those existential 
questions – What is Europe? What does it mean to be 
European? What purpose a European Union? – that 
made the European project a vision and a movement 
rather than simply the set of paradoxical and absurd 
institutions and administrative practices that Marquand 
claims it has become.  In his “Preface to the Paperback 
Edition”, Marquand suggests an answer to the ques-
tions that Europeans have lately failed to ask; noting 
that such crises as the acute one that struck the Euro-
zone in late 2011 “create opportunities”, he advocates 
a “European New Deal” that “would entail fiscal union, 
governed and legitimized by democratic institutions 
in place of the current technocratic ones.” (xvi)  This 
can only be possible, however, once Europeans have 
sorted out the thornier issues of identity and purpose. 
While frequently striking a bitter and disillusioned tone, 
Marquand also shows that he really hasn’t given up on 
Europe.
 Marquand begins with a sweeping review of “the 
West” as a concept framing identity and difference 
from the days of the Greeks and following a continuous 
thread through the Cold War.  This rhetorical narrative 
assured those who identified with it “where” they were 
and “who” they were – “the home of reason, efficiency, 
and evolutionary success” – particularly in relation to 
“an unenlightened and backward ‘East’”, assumptions 
that “had always been patronizing and misleading” 
now proven to be “patently absurd.” (19)  The end of 
the Cold War eroded some of the certainty that the as-
sumption provided by neutralizing the tension between 
opposing poles upon which it was partly based; the 
recent financial collapse has effectively undermined it 
altogether.  Marquand uses this prologue to establish 
the perception of “the West” as a myth that global soci-
ety has outgrown, especially given that Europeans no 
longer have the leverage to impose it on others.  He 
contends that it is now incumbent upon Europeans to 
consider themselves and their society more realistically 
and with the kind of boldness exhibited by Jean Monnet 
and the other founding architects of integration.
 Marquand expresses admiration for these founders, 
who conceived a Europe transformed by ideas and ide-
als in response to the endemic threats of internecine 
war and murderous ethnic nationalism.  He writes “as 
a committed friend of the European project, not as a 
foe,” (25) having participated himself in the evolution 
of that project during the late 1970s as Chief Advisor 
to the European Commission’s president, Roy Jenkins, 
and depicts the early decades of integration as inspired 
success.  Since the collapse of Soviet communism and 
the apparent triumph of “the West”, however, Europe 
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has become mired in a slough of its own ambiguities. 
These relate to insufficiently examined questions of 
identity and ethnicity, governance and authority, terri-
tory, and – suffused through the others – politics, each 
the successive topics for the remaining three chapters. 
Embedded in the European project from its inception, 
recent developments have exacerbated them to the 
point that these unresolved ambiguities now serve, in 
Marquand’s analysis, as the sources for the disconnect, 
division, and uncertainty currently afflicting Europe.
 The chapter on identity and ethnicity is the most 
stimulating among those addressing the ambiguities 
that Marquand identifies.  He observes how global-
ization, the very success of integration itself, and a 
“neo-medieval provincialism” privileging rediscovered 
sub-national cultural identities equally undermine the 
power and legitimacy of the states – legacies of the 
Westphalian system – upon which European integra-
tion was based but which it also sought to transcend. 
Europeans’ multiple identities do not nestle into each 
other neatly like Russian dolls – they are fluid, evolving, 
and most importantly potentially explosive.  Marquand 
spends half of the chapter reflecting upon an especially 
complicating feature of this ambiguity – Muslim Europe-
ans, communities of which have existed since nearly the 
beginning of Islam itself but which were never integrated 
into the mythical image of “the West” that has now col-
lapsed under closer scrutiny.  He provocatively charac-
terizes Islamophobia as “the true twenty-first equivalent 
of the Judaeophobia and eventual anti-Semitism that 
culminated in the horrors of the twentieth” (91) and chal-
lenges the political and personal tropes – from both right 
and left – that project a monolithic Islam threatening the 
putatively integral identity of the “European West.”  No 
such identity actually exists, of course, which is the point 
that Marquand develops in the first part of the chapter; 
recognizing and reckoning with that truth, he suggests, 
forces Europeans to reconceive what it means to be 
“European” and thus avoid repeating the nightmarish 
history of ethnic violence.
 Marquand insists that doing so involves a political 
as much as a cultural and intellectual process, since 
the fundamental question that Europe must confront, for 
him, is “how to grow a European demos that can sustain 
a European federation.” (177)  The implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 was “a staging post 
on a journey…, not the destination itself, an opportunity 
to take stock and look ahead, not an excuse for dodging 
the great questions of purpose, principle, and power 
that now press in on European peoples and elites.” 
(103)  Those questions especially concern Europe’s am-
biguous political identity stuck between federalism and 
confederalism, between democracy and technocracy. 
The Lisbon ratification process represents a missed 
opportunity for a European-wide debate – similar to 
the one that led to the ratification of the U.S. Constitu-
tion in 1789 (not 1788) – rather than the serial dramas 
that played out in individual member states.  This was 
emblematic of the democratic deficit that disconnects 
Europeans from the institutions that increasingly govern 
them and keeps them divided as European peoples, 
not a European people.  He accuses the European 
elites of shirking from “high politics” with its profound 
questions of legitimacy and moral authority, preferring 
to focus instead on the “institutional nuts and bolts” 
(114) of “low politics” that has nevertheless led to such 
contradictions as a monetary union side by side with 
fiscal disunion and the promotion of democratization in 
Central and Eastern Europe while remaining democrati-
cally deficient in its own processes.  Marquand advo-
cates a democratically elected European presidency 
and European-wide referenda on such questions as 
the admission of member states as possible openings 
for generating a more integrated democratic culture – 
Europe is as Europe does.
 But where does Europe begin and end?  Here the 
question of governance folds back again onto that of 
identity.  Marquand criticizes the European elites for 
pushing forward with expansion without adequately 
contemplating the consequences for either the EU or 
the new member states.  The result has been a further 
muddling of European identity – such as it was – in 
that the accession of the post-communist states of 
Central and Eastern Europe changed the very entity 
they joined by the very act of joining it.  Europe has 
become broader without getting deeper, Marquand 
claims.  He cautions against extending membership to 
Turkey until that country has sorted out its own issues 
of identity – not because Turkey is poor or because 
it’s Muslim, but because “it is one of the last redoubts 
of ethnic nationalism”: “Atatürk’s aggressive secularist 
legacy is the problem, not Muhammad’s religious one.” 
(175)  To borrow a phrase out of context, Marquand is 
counseling “smart growth” in Europe as opposed to 
headlong expansion.
 Marquand admits early on to offering no “ready-
made blueprint for the future, still less a toolbox of 
institutional quick fixes” (25), but he does call attention 
to important questions linked to a grander vision – and 
engages them in a compelling way.  His book is a pas-
sionate meditation written by one who appears critical 
only because he still believes so much in a movement 
that has become disoriented.  It should be required 
reading for all who care about the European project, 
the challenges it faces, and the direction it’s headed.
 
Michael Clinton
Gwynedd-Mercy College
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Givens, Terri and Maxwell, Rahsaan (eds.).  Immi-
grant Politics:  Race and Representation in Western 
Europe. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012. 
 Studies on immigrant integration into West-Eu-
ropean societies represent a growth area in compara-
tive European research. This trend is not surprising, 
given the opportunities and challenges it brings forward 
across key analytical domains: institutional arrange-
ments governing citizenship and naturalization, policies 
of multiculturalism and welfare inclusiveness, and the 
political integration of immigrant communities through 
representation and participation in politics. Despite the 
presence of several important recent publications, im-
migrant political integration has remained relatively un-
derresearched. By presenting an in-depth examination 
of a variety of electoral and policy-relevant issues per-
taining to the political representation of immigrant-origin 
ethnic communities in Western Europe, Immigrant Poli-
tics makes an unequivocal contribution to the literature 
and outlines new directions for research, analysis, and 
comparison.   
 The book explores the political integration of 
immigrant communities on the example of the coun-
tries with the largest nonwhite immigrant populations 
in Western Europe: Britain, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. It then turns to examine the role of race 
and equality in the legislative politics of the European 
Union and presents a concluding discussion of the 
findings through the lens of transatlantic comparisons. 
While the analytical focus is on the party establishment 
(chapter by Jonathan Laurence and Rahsaan Maxwell 
on political parties and diversity in Western Europe), the 
empirical findings and conclusions refer to the broader 
context of party competition established by the distinc-
tiveness of electoral institutions which determine the 
relative openness of domestic political space to the in-
clusion of immigrant-origin minorities, relationships be-
tween the state and societal actors, and the process 
that links party politics to the systems of social provi-
sion.  
 The richly contextualized analysis of the suc-
cesses and failures of the political integration of immi-
grant communities across Western Europe (chapters by 
James Hampshire on the UK, Vincent Geisser and El 
Yamine Soum on  France, Karen Schönwälder on Ger-
many, and Laure Michon on the Netherlands) applies a 
variety of coherently pursued research strategies in or-
der to determine whether and how the electoral process 
has contributed to increasing immigrant participation in 
politics: a supply-demand framework for the examina-
tion of party systems interactions and minority claims, 
the reference to race as a category of political analy-
sis, the concepts of descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation which lie at the core of the argument about 
the differentiated process of immigrant integration into 
West-European politics, and the study of its European 
dimension as a political response to the rise of the radi-
cal right in key European states, with critical input on 
behalf of transnational advocacy and EU institutional 
actors. 
 The book contributes valuable insights into the 
complexity of the political integration of immigrant-origin 
communities by tracing the missing link between the 
gradual improvement of their descriptive representation 
and the slow pace of substantive representation, both in 
terms of formulation of minority demands by grassroots 
groups and candidates, and their effective influence on 
policy making. The case studies find that while cross-
national convergence in the descriptive representation 
of immigrant-origin ethnic minorities in West-European 
politics may be improving in parallel with their growing 
contribution to expanding the electoral base for politi-
cal parties, national immigration policies are becoming 
more restrictive. The cases thus validate the proposi-
tion of a multidimensional, differentiated, and contingent 
process of immigrant integration into politics.   
 The examination of the European dimension 
of immigrant-minority political participation opens up a 
new analytical perspective and strengthens the country 
case study analyses. The chapter devoted to the role of 
race in the evolution of the normative order of the Eu-
ropean Union (Terri Givens and Rhonda Evans Case) 
traces the interactions between EU institutional actors 
and transnational advocacy groups which have led to a 
treaty revision and established racial equality and non-
discrimination as a foundational EU policy. The conclud-
ing discussion (chapter by Martin Schain) reinforces the 
comparative insights of the study by elaborating on the 
significance of the links between the institutional and 
political dimensions of representation and public policy, 
and by introducing a transatlantic perspective. While 
the individual contributions to this volume point to per-
sisting variation in the national models of immigrant mi-
nority integration, they also demonstrate that as a result 
of inclusive public discourse and reliable national and 
EU-based anti-discrimination legislation guaranteeing 
equality, the political representation of immigrant-origin 
communities in Western Europe has been able to make 
gradual, however noticeable advances. 
 In summary, by elucidating important aspects 
of immigrant political participation through case study 
analyses of trends at the European, national, group, 
and local level of politics, the book presents a multidi-
mensional discussion of the categories of race, equality, 
and immigrant integration into West-European societ-
ies. Immigrant Politics is an important resource for aca-
demic audiences, researchers, experts, policy makers, 
and institutions.     
Boyka Stefanova
University of Texas at San Antonio
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Liebert, Ulrike and Trenz, Hans-Joerg (eds.). The 
New Politics of European Civil Society.  London: Rout-
ledge, 2011.
 The academic interest in ‘European Civil Soci-
ety’ increased in the past decade, based on the EU’s 
highlighting of its role in delimiting the democratic defi-
cit, and the seemingly exploding number of NGOs and 
other public interest associations voicing their claims. 
The scholarly literature on this topic is similarly expand-
ing, but conceptual clarifications, realistic normative as-
sessments and empirical studies regarding the specifi-
cally ‘European’ nature of the diverse groups assembled 
under the term ‘civil society’ are still required. It is here 
that Liebert & Trenz’s carefully edited volume makes a 
useful contribution to the field. 
 Liebert, a well-known professor at the Center for 
European Studies, University of Bremen, and Trenz, a 
research professor at the University of Oslo’s ARENA 
Center for European Studies, assembled a team of 
mostly senior scholars in this particular research area 
to explore questions of the constitution(alization) of civil 
society in the process of European integration, and its 
impact on the democratic quality of the EU. They argue 
that the way transnational civil society has been impli-
cated in EU integration in the past decade has led to 
genuinely new loci of power and legitimacy in the EU’s 
governance system: “we intend to conceptualize and 
normatively and empirically analyze the innovate ways 
in which civil society has made inroads into EU gover-
nance, be it as loyal partner or critical counterpart (7).” 
This means that a strengthening of civil society through 
the EU has brought additional challenges for the legiti-
macy of, for instance, powerful INGOs that are in dan-
ger of being co-opted, but also for the EU institutions 
that have to respond to claims made by such groups.  In 
the course, normative evaluations of what is considered 
appropriate and ‘civil’ in the process of integration ap-
pear as well.
 The first part dealing with conceptual clarifica-
tions centers on the untangling of the umbrella term 
‘civil society’. In it, Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine 
Quittkat present in a meta-analysis a survey among fel-
low academics regarding their conception of civil soci-
ety. They find that not only a representative aspect, but 
also a participatory notion is present, each of which ex-
hibits a different degree of inclusion of the various civil 
society actors. Klaus Eder, in his sociological analysis 
notes how civil society can be ‘imagined’, ‘practiced’ or 
‘staged’ and thus attain a symbolic-performative charac-
ter in a play in which it shares the stage with other (su-
pra-)national governance actors. Part Two comprises of 
two normatively oriented chapters: one by Kohler-Koch 
examines three different configurations of civil society 
(as intermediaries, as stakeholders and as social con-
stituency) that are less based on the expressive will of 
these associations alone, but rather are connected and 
conditioned by the degree of “participatory engineering” 
(68) of the Commission’s consultation scheme. Stijn 
Smismans compares European citizenship and Euro-
pean civil society notions and advocates that these two 
interlinked concepts should be viewed as complemen-
tary practice as they have similar participatory objec-
tives in the Union. In the last, empirical section based 
mostly on interview data, Liebert suggests that the 
“dual nature” (119) of European civil society oscillates 
between being a critical partner by voicing public con-
cerns, and also becoming a loyal partner for the EU pol-
ity. Trenz et al., in their cross-sectoral survey of German 
civil society, confirm the representation of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) as promoters of European unifi-
catory ideals. Carlo Ruzza’s chapter on ‘uncivil society’ 
distinguishes it to anti-politics and right-wing parties but 
makes clear that even those groups that are “in contra-
position to a universalistic ethos” (148) often link up to 
political parties with similar goals. The last two substan-
tive chapters highlight the particularities of civil society 
in the post-communist ‘new’ EU member states. One, 
by David Ost, argues that its decline is based on its co-
emergence with the capitalist model, and thus not seen 
as radical-emancipatory anymore. And Heiko Pleines 
finds that while CSOs from post-communist member 
states are formally adequately integrated in EU gover-
nance, they still lack leverage to independently effect 
policy change in Brussels. Finally, Andrew Arato offers 
his reflections on the contributor’s chapters.
 The results of the normative and empirical anal-
yses of this volume contribute to a more differentiated 
picture of civil society as influenced by governance insti-
tutions, competing movements and parties as well as by 
contested normative (self)perceptions. Hence this book 
nicely highlights the conditioning interplay between civil 
society actors and EU institutions and the impact such 
interaction – and linkage - has on the legitimacy of a 
European constitutionalization process written large, 
although an investigation of few more determining vari-
ables (such as access/accreditation, or funding by the 
EU) could have provided for more robust assessments. 
Overall, however, this volume succeeds as an updated 
compendium of recent developments in European civil 
society.
Markus Thiel
Florida International University
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